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Abstract
This Comment analyzes the recent House of Lords decision that did not recognize that uni-
versal jurisdiction existed over jus cogens crimes before the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention against Torture” or “Con-
vention”) came into effect, and therefore did not consider Senator Pinochet’s acts of torture com-
mitted prior to the existence of the Convention. Part I discusses the atrocities committed in Chile,
and examines the legal doctrines applicable to prosecuting Senator Pinochet. In this light, Part
I discusses the development of universal jurisdiction and its applicability to human rights viola-
tions. Part I also traces the development of sovereign immunity and its interaction with human
rights violations. Finally, this Part reviews the nature and substance of a jus cogens offense, and
analyzes whether a sovereign should be granted immunity for such crimes. Part II focuses upon
the Pinochet extradition hearings. This Part first outlines the High Court’s ruling and reasoning,
and then examines the House of Lords’ conclusion that Pinochet would not be tried for acts of
torture committed before the enactment of the Convention against Torture. Finally, Part III argues
that the jus cogens nature of the crimes alleged against Pinochet subjects him to universal juris-
diction, with or without a convention that explicitly recognizes universal jurisdiction. Pinochet,
therefore, can be prosecuted for all of the charges brought against him, including those committed
before the adoption of the Convention against Torture.
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1973 and lasting seventeen years, Senator Au-
gusto Pinochet Ugarte allegedly committed heinous acts of tor-
ture upon the citizens of Chile.' Under Pinochet's supervision,
military subordinates systematically broke people's bones, and
burned or dragged them through bushes from a helicopter.2
Furthermore, these subordinates applied electric shocks to preg-
nant women and to men's genitals, and severely beat people.'
They also trained dogs to rape women, and forced captives to
watch a, father sodomize his son.4 Pinochet allegedly ordered
the commission of all of these acts in an effort to overthrow the
existing government and maintain power in Chile.5
Pinochet is currently awaiting extradition to Spain6 to face
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Fordham University School of Law. This Comment is
dedicated to my family for their unconditional love and support.
1. REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
32 (Phillip E. Berryman, trans., 1993) (translation of the official government report,
Informe de la Comisi6n Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliaci6n, also known as the In-
forme Rettig) [hereinafter Rettig Report]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, The Inescapable Obli-
gation of the International Community to Bring to Justice Those Responsible for Crimes Against
Humanity Committed During the Military Government in Chile (last modified Oct. 29, 1998)
<http://www.amnesty.org/news/1998/22201698.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal); Rebecca Leung, The Story Behind a Dictator, (visited Oct. 13, 1999)
<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/pinochetprofile.html> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
2. Pinochet Hearings Resume, with Change of Tack, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 19,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2531079.
3. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Chilean Gov't Is Making a Mockery of Duties to Citizens, M2
PIRsswlRE, Jan. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7551292.
4. Id.
5. Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 73.
6. Mara D. Bellaby, Long-Awaited Decision: London Court Orders Pinochet to Spain (last
modified Oct. 8, 1999) <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/pinoche-
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prosecution for the acts of torture committed in Chile during his
dictatorship.7 He claims that such acts were sovereign8 acts and
that he deserves protection under the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity.9 Following World War II, however, parties to interna-
tional agreements began recognizing that individual sovereigns
can and should be held personally accountable for acts that were
previously protected by immunity.'° Although scholars note that
it remains important for states to grant each other immunity so
that they maintain good foreign relations, there are certain in-
ternational norms, such as the prohibition of torture, that over-
ride sovereign immunity."' When an individual such as Senator
Pinochet commits atrocities, he or she should be subject to juris-
diction in any state at any time for all of his or her crimes.
trule991008.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). On October 8,
1999, London's Deputy Chief Magistrate Ronald Bartle ruled that the charges alleged
against Senator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte are extraditable crimes and Pinochet should
be extradited to Spain to stand trial. Id. Author's note: At the time of publication the
U.K. High Court upheld Home SecretaryJack Straw's finding that Pinochet is medically
unfit to stand trial and, therefore, cannot be extradited to Spain.
7. Pinochet Supporters Step Up Campaign, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 13, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 2654128. Specifically, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon alleged that
"[b]etween 11 September 1973 and 31 December 1983, within the jurisdiction of the
Fifth Central Magistrates' Court of the National Court of Madrid, [Pinochet] did mur-
der Spanish citizens in Chile within thejurisdiction of the Government of Spain." In re
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68, 76 (Q.B. 1998).
8. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1323 (6th ed. 1996) (defining sovereign as "person,
body, or state in which independent and supreme authority is vested").
9. See id. (explaining that doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes bringing suit
against government without consent); Hari M. Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity from
Severe Human Rights Violations: New Directions for Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y.
INT'L L. REV. 35, 38-39 (1998) (explaining that sovereign immunity originated as abso-
lute exemption from suit but human rights norms caused erosion in privilege).
10. See, e.g., Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945,
art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter] (de-
fining crimes within tribunal's jurisdiction for which individuals are held responsible,
including crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity); Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L LAw
COMM'N 374-78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles]
("The fact that a person committed an act which constitutes a crime under interna-
tional law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve
him from responsibility tinder international law.").
11. See Mary Ellen Turpel & Philippe Sands, Peremptory International Law and Sover-
eignty: Some Questions, 3 CONN. J. lrr'L L. 364, 365 (1988) ("The guidance of interna-
tional legal theory toward jus cogens or peremptory law has been part of an ongoing
struggle to move beyond unrestricted state sovereignty.., to establish an international
rule of law.").
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This Comment analyzes the recent House of Lords
decision' 2  that did not recognize that universal jurisdic-
tion'" existed over jus cogens'4 crimes before the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment 5 ("Convention against Torture" or "Con-
vention") came into effect, and therefore did not consider Sena-
tor Pinochet's acts of torture committed prior to the existence of
the Convention. Part I discusses the atrocities committed in
Chile, and examines the legal doctrines applicable to prosecut-
ing Senator Pinochet. In this light, Part I discusses the develop-
ment of universal jurisdiction and its applicability to human
rights violations. Part I also traces the development of sovereign
immunity and its interaction with human rights violations. Fi-
nally, this Part reviews the nature and substance of a jus cogens
offense, and analyzes whether a sovereign should be granted im-
munity for such crimes. Part II focuses upon the Pinochet extra-
dition hearings. This Part first outlines the High Court's 6 rul-
ing and reasoning, and then examines the House of Lords' con-
clusion that Pinochet would not be tried for acts of torture
committed before the enactment of the Convention against Tor-
ture. Finally, Part III argues that the jus cogens nature of the
crimes alleged against Pinochet subjects him to universal juris-
diction, with or without a convention that explicitly recognizes
universal jurisdiction. Pinochet, therefore, can be prosecuted
for all of the charges brought against him, including those com-
mitted before the adoption of the Convention against Torture.
12. Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others
Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999).
13. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 304 (4th ed. 1990)
(defining universal jurisdiction as power of domestic court to prosecute non-national
offender regardless of connection between offender and prosecuting state because na-
ture of crime is of international concern).
14. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW 489 (1992) (defining jus cogens as principle whose importance rises to level
that is acknowledged to be superior to another principle and thus overrides it).
15. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.
51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Convention against Torture].
16. See The Judicial Work of the House of Lords (visited Aug. 3, 1999) <http://
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldinfo/ldO8judg/
ld08judg.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (explaining that
House of Lords hears criminal appeals from Divisional Court of Queen's Bench Divi-
sion of High Court).
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I. PINOCHET'S REIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
DOCTRINES APPLICABLE TO ALLEGATIONS
OF TORTURE
Pinochet allegedly committed numerous human rights vio-
lations throughout his seventeen years as dictator of Chile."
During his reign, Pinochet's government issued Decree Law No.
2191, which Pinochet believed protected him from facing crimi-
nal liability for his acts. 8 The doctrine of universal jurisdiction,
however, significantly expanded after World War II to subject
individuals to the courts of any nation for crimes such as geno-
cide, hostage taking, and torture. 9 The Convention against Tor-
ture grants a system of universal jurisdiction, thereby exposing
individuals to the courts of foreign nations for acts of torture
committed after the adoption of the Convention.2" Pinochet ar-
gues that he is protected by sovereign immunity,2' a doctrine
that originated as an absolute exemption from suit, but scholars
note that the protection of the doctrine is diminishing as more
individuals face accountability for their actions.2 2 The jus cogens
nature of torture raises further controversy as to whether an in-
dividual should be protected by immunity for crimes as atrocious
as those committed by Senator Pinochet.2 3
17. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1; Leung, supra note 1.
18. DECREE LAW No. 2191 (Apr. 18, 1978) (Chile), published in DIARIO OFIcIAL, No.
30,042 (Apr. 19, 1978) (granting amnesty to individuals who committed criminal acts
between September 1973 and March 1978).
19. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion]; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 12, 1979, G.A.
Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 99, U.N. Doc. A/34/819, 18 I.L.M. 1456
(1979); Convention against Torture, supra note 15.
20. Convention against Torture, supra note 15, arts. 5-7.
21. See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and
others Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581, 609 (H.L. 1999) (noting that case before
House of Lords was appeal of decision to quash warrant on grounds that as former
head of state of Chile, Pinochet was entitled to immunity from arrest and extradition
proceedings in United Kingdom).
22. CoVEY T. OLIVER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 580 (4th ed. 1995); see Osofsky, supra note 9, at 38-40 (recognizing human rights
exception to sovereign immunity).
23. Compare Ilias Bantekas, State Responsibility in Private Civil Action-Sovereign Immu-
nity-Immunity forJus Cogens Violations-Belligerent Occupation-Peace Treaties, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 765 (1998) (discussing exceptions to immunity where jus cogens rules are vio-
lated), with Andreas Zimmerman, Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus
Cogens-Some Critical Remarks, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 433 (1995) (arguing that denying
immunity for human rights violations is illegal and politically unwise).
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A. Pinochet's Reign
Pinochet rose to power in 1973 by leading a military over-
throw of the existing government, and maintained power for sev-
enteen years.2 4  During his reign, he committed numerous
human rights violations in an effort to retain power. 25 When his
dictatorship finally ceased, Pinochet instituted several mecha-
nisms to ensure that he could not be prosecuted for the crimes
he committed. 26 In 1998, however, a Spanish judge issued a war-
rant for his arrest while Pinochet was in London receiving medi-
cal treatment.
27
1. Pinochet's Rise to Power
After a narrow victory in 1970,28 Dr. Salvador Allende Gos-
sens became the first democratically elected Marxist in the West-
ern Hemisphere. 29 In an attempt to reform the capitalist system,
Allende developed socialist programs and drastically changed
Chile's economic policy.3 0 In response, rightist Chileans under-
took a program of economic destabilization, involving credit re-
strictions and causing shortages in materials, goods, and food. 1
By 1973, the conflict in economic ideologies created a bitter divi-
sion between President Allende's followers and the many Chile-
ans unhappy with the Marxist-Leninist direction of his govern-
24. Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 73; Leung, supra note 1.
25. See Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 62 (recognizing military's goal of eliminating
people regarded as ultraleft).
26. CONSTITUCI6N POLdTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE (1980); DECREE LAw No.
2191, supra note 18.
27. Ex-dictators Are Not Immune, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1998, at 16.
28. See The Pinochet Affair: Blackwashing Allende, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999, available
in 1999 WL 7361564 (stating that Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens was elected with only
36.5% of vote in three-way race).
29. See Dixie Barlow, Confronting the Ghosts of the Past, WASHINGTONPOST.NEWSWEEK
INTERAcrwE (last modified Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
inatl/longterm/pinochet/overview.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (noting that Allende had run unsuccessfully for president twice before).
30. See id. (stating that government redistributed lands, nationalized banks, and
overtook copper mines and other industries).
31. See Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 51 (discussing role of 1972 economic crisis in
bringing about eventual broader crisis in 1973); see also RobertJ. Quinn, Note, Will the
Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. Riv. 905, 911 (1994) (discussing background
of events in Chile leading up to coup).
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ment 2 As the conflict heightened, leftists advocated the use of
violence to defend the government while rightists openly called
for military intervention.3 The climate in Chile was comparable
to that of a civil war.3 4
On September 11, 1973, Pinochet, then Commander-in-
Chief of the Chilean Army and Supreme Commander of the Na-
tion, led a military junta in staging a coup d'etat. 5 In less than
one week, the entire nation came under military control.3 6 The
junta continued to rule the State for sixteen years, with Pinochet
as President of the Republic.37
During the years of Pinochet's presidency, the military un-
dertook economic reforms that were widely admired, and it
maintained a significant amount of public support."' During
this period, however, a secret group of military officers, the Na-
tional Intelligence Directorate ("DINA"), began its task of elimi-
nating those individuals that it regarded as ultraleft.39 This pro-
gram involved gross human rights violations, including disap-
pearances, executions, use of undue force, abuse of power,
torture, and terrorist acts.40
32. Elliott Abrams, JusticeforPinochet?, COMMENTARY, Mar. 1, 1999, available in 1999
WL 3660355.
33. Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 50.
34. See id. at 50-53 (evaluating factors of Chile's climate before coup, which taken
together reflect impossibility of peaceful coexistence).
35. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (defining coup d'etat as polit-
ical move to overthrow existing government by force); see also Rettig Report, supra note
1, at 73 (discussing installation of junta). The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency aided
the Chilean military in the coup with training and financing. Barlow, supra note 29.
36. See Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 57 (noting that junta assumed executive,
legislative, and constituent powers of state, but not judiciary). Although the judiciary
formally retained its independence, most members of the court agreed with the new
regime so there was no threat to the takeover from the judiciary. Id.
37. Barlow, supra note 29.
38. See Abrams, supra note 32 (noting that at end of regime, 43% of Chileans voted
for Pinochet to continue ruling).
39. Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 62.
40. Id. at 35-39; see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 3 (reporting specific acts
alleged, including: suspending woman from pole in pit, pulling out finger and toe
nails, and burning her; systematically breaking man's wrists, pelvis, ribs, and skull and
burning him; applying electric shocks to body parts of pregnant woman and putting
cigarettes out on stomach); Pinochet Hearings Resume, supra note 2 (noting particular
acts alleged, including: applying electric currents to man's genitals and repeatedly
beating entire body; using dogs trained to rape women; forcing captives to watch father
sodomize son; and dragging detainees through thorn bushes from helicopter).
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2. Pinochet's Decline in Power
The majority of deaths during Pinochet's dictatorship oc-
curred during the four months following the coup.4" Repression
lessened at the end of the 1970s, with the DINA formally dissolv-
ing in 1978.42 In 1980, Pinochet's government created a new
constitution for Chile4 3 that kept him in office until 1989, and
established a senator for life status for ex-presidents who had
served for over six years. It contained provisions for a gradual
return to democracy, a restoration of a limited, appointed Na-
tional Congress in 1990, and a presidential election in 1997.45
The constitution also incorporated Decree Law No. 2191,46 a
blanket amnesty law covering crimes committed during the coup
through 1978 when the junta issued the decree. Under this
amnesty law, Pinochet is immune from prosecution in Chile.48
In a 1988 plebiscite in which Pinochet questioned the Chil-
ean populace on whether he should remain in power for an-
other eight years, he only received forty-three percent of the
vote, thus ending his sixteen-year dictatorship. 49 Pinochet nego-
tiated a deal that would keep him as head of the armed forces
until 1998, after which he would become senator for life.50 In
1990, Chile returned to a democratic government when Patricio
Aylwin was elected as the first President of Chile's transition pe-
riod.5 '
In the years following his reign, Pinochet was careful not to
travel to the countries of origin of the torture victims. 5 2 In Octo-
41. Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 73-80.
42. See id. at 88 (explaining dissolution of DINA and creation of National Center
for Information ("CNI")).
43. CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE (1980).
44. Barlow, supra note 29; see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1 (stating that
senators for life have complete immunity under national law).
45. Barlow, supra note 29.
46. DECREE LAw No. 2191, supra note 18.
47. See Quinn, supra note 31 at 905-06 (arguing need to dismantle decree).
48. DECREE LAw No. 2191, supra note 18.
49. See Abrams, supra note 32 (explaining that democratic government came into
office after Chileans voted against Pinochet remaining in power, and that task of new
government was to deal with human rights abuses under prior military dictatorship).
50. See Barlow, supra note 29 (noting that constitution established new senator for
life status for ex-presidents who served more than six years).
51. Rettig Report, supra note 1, at 767 n.d.
52. See ForeignJail Ideal Placefor Pinochets Last Days, CANBERRA TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 24329142 (providing example that Pinochet did not travel to
United States because United States "would like to talk to him about the car bomb that
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ber 1998, Pinochet traveled to London for back surgery believ-
ing that he would be safe from prosecution. After his surgery,
however, the London police barged into his hospital room to
deliver a warrant for his arrest.54 Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon
issued the warrant, alleging that between 1973 and 1990 Pi-
nochet was involved in the violent overthrow of Chile's demo-
cratic government and committed numerous human rights viola-
tions against Spanish citizens in order to gain and maintain
power.55
B. Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction 6 empowers the courts of any nation
to prosecute certain crimes regardless of the state in which such
crimes are committed.5 7 The earliest applications of the princi-
ple of universal jurisdiction involved piracy and slave trading.58
Following World War II, the principle expanded to include war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and it continues to evolve
to cover certain terrorist acts and other human rights viola-
tions. 59
his agents planted to kill a former Chilean ambassador to the U.S. and his American
aide").
53. See id. (noting that Pinochet was major customer of British arms industry, fre-
quently visited Britain, and had tea with former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher).
54. Ex-dictators Are Not Immune, supra note 27, at 16.
55. See In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68, 76 (Q.B. 1998) (quoting war-
rant, which stated that "[b]etween 11 September 1973 and 31 December 1983, within
the jurisdiction of the Fifth Central Magistrates' Court of the National Court of Madrid,
[Pinochet] did murder Spanish citizens in Chile within the jurisdiction of the Govern-
ment of Spain").
56. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 304 (defining universal jurisdiction as power of
domestic court to prosecute non-national offender regardless of connection between
offender and prosecuting state because nature of crime is of international concern).
57. See BAssIoUNI, supra note 14, at 512 ("The rationale for universal jurisdiction
... is that there exist certain offenses, which due to their very nature, affect the interests
of all states, even when committed in another state or against another state, victim or
interest.").
58. See Kenneth C. Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 785, 791-800 (1988) (noting that "pirates and slave traders have long been consid-
ered enemies of all humanity").
59. See generally id. (arguing that universal jurisdiction has expanded to allow any
nation to prosecute those charged with offenses that international community widely
condemns); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 305 (suggesting that hijacking and of-
fenses related to narcotics trafficking are probably subject to universal jurisdiction).
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1. Early Applications of Universal Jurisdiction
Piracy is the oldest offense 60 that eliminated the require-
ment of a nexus between the accused and the prosecuting state,
an essential requirement for any of the theories under which
states obtain jurisdiction.61 Pirates often committed heinous acts
against numerous states, thus rendering them hostes humani
generis, or enemies of the human race.62 Since pirates existed
when most commercial activity between nations occurred
through maritime operations, their lawless acts were harmful to
the world and thus a concern for all nations.63
Scholars note that slave trading is also a global offense be-
60. See Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARv. L. REv. 334, 337
(1925) (noting that pirates were subject to universal jurisdiction at least as early as 17th
century). While universal jurisdiction over piracy was originally a matter of customary
international law, it eventually became recognized under treaty law. Convention on the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. The convention states:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and
under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on
board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon
the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken
with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third
parties acting in good faith.
Id. art. 19, 13 U.S.T. at 2317, 450 U.N.T.S. at 92.
61. See Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction
in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 163-65
(1996) (discussing five principles ofjurisdiction, including territoriality, where offense
occurs within prosecuting state's territory; nationality, where offender is national of
prosecuting state; protective, where act outside prosecuting state's territory threatens
that state's interests; passive personality, where victim is national of prosecuting state;
and universality, where act committed is so universally abhorrent that offender may be
prosecuted in any jurisdiction where he is secured); see also BASSiOUNI, supra note 14, at
511 (noting that all theories except universality require connection between prosecut-
ing state and offender to exercise jurisdiction). For a detailed discussion of the princi-
ples of jurisdiction, see BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 300-05. Brownlie further asserts
that universality over war crimes is a principle ofjurisdiction separate from the univer-
sality principle because universality over war crimes punishes breaches of international
law, not acts that international law permits all states to punish under national law even
though not declared criminal by international law. Id. at 305.
62. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 738 (6th ed. 1990) (defining hostis humani generis
as enemies of human race); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844)
("A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani generis ... [b]ecause he
commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all nations without any
regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public authority.").
63. See 2 BARRY H. DUBNER, THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 45 (1980) (sug-
gesting that allowing any state to capture and punish pirates is "a matter of sea-polic-
ing").
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cause it violates an individual's fundamental right to freedom.
64
Thus, several instruments of international law recognize slave
trading as an offense subject to universal jurisdiction.65 While
slave trading does not threaten commerce or navigation between
nations in the same way as piracy, its atrocious nature renders it
subject to international condemnation. 66 A nexus between the
offender and the capturing nation, therefore, is not necessary
for a state to invoke jurisdiction over an individual charged with
slavery.6 7
2. Modern Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction
Following World War II, universal jurisdiction expanded to
grant states the power to punish those who commit war crimes,66
regardless of a lack of connection between the offender and the
prosecuting state. 69 The expansion of universal jurisdiction oc-
curred principally during the Nuremberg trials. 70 The Charter
of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 71 ("Nurem-
berg Charter") and the common articles of the Four Geneva
64. See Randall, supra note 58, at 800 (noting that heinous nature of slavery ren-
dered it subject to universal jurisdiction even though slavery is unlike piracy in that it
did not threaten interstate commerce and maritime navigation).
65. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat.
2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 7
U.S.T. 479, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Supplementary Convention of the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similarly to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T.
3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
66. SeeJoyner, supra 61, at 165 n.49 (suggesting that violation of individuals' funda-
mental rights to liberty and freedom is offense against all humanity).
67. Randall, supra note 58, at 800.
68. For a general discussion of the unlawful nature of war crimes, seeJoyner, supra
note 61, at 155-62.
69. See Randall, supra note 58, at 800-15 (reasoning that war crimes are particularly
reprehensible because they endanger human lives, may adversely affect international
commerce and transportation, and may destabilize international legal order); see also
BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 305 ("It is now generally accepted that breaches of the laws
of war... may be punished by any state which obtains custody of persons suspected of
responsibility.").
70. See Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 833, 884-85 (1990) ("Nuremberg was a watershed event that pointed inter-
national law towards a more humane and enlightened interpretation and application.
It also helped to revive universal jurisdiction .... ").
71. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 10, art. 6, 59 Stat. at 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. at
288 ("The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: (a) Crimes against
peace . . . (b) War crimes . . . (c) Crimes against humanity . . .").
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Conventions of 194972 explicitly identify the obligation of states
to hold individuals responsible for criminal acts regardless of any
nexus to the prosecuting state.7 3
States hold individuals accountable for the commission of
war crimes regardless of their lack of nexus to the prosecuting
state because war crimes are sufficiently atrocious to compare
them with crimes that previously warranted universal jurisdic-
tion.7 ' Furthermore, scholars argue that claims to sovereign im-
munity should be ignored in determining whether universal ju-
risdiction is applicable to a war criminal because the underlying
crimes are often committed beyond the sovereign control of any
responsible government. 75 Accordingly, two cases involving
crimes committed during World War II applied the theory of
universal jurisdiction to try individuals for war crimes.7 6
In 1962 in Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann,7 7 the
72. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV] (collectively "1949 Geneva Con-
ventions"). The 1949 Geneva Conventions articulate grave breaches of international
law that states are required to punish, including willful killing, torture, and inhuman
treatment. Geneva I, supra, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva II, supra,
art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva III, supra, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420,
75 U.N.T.S. at 238; Geneva IV, supra, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
73. See identical provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 72, at Ge-
neva I art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva II art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75
U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva III art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; Geneva IV art.
146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386 (stating that each party to the Convention
"shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to
have ordered to be committed.... grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regard-
less of their nationality, before its own courts") (emphasis added).
74. See Joyner, supra note 61, at 166-67 (noting that war crimes, like piracy and
slave trading, involve violent, abhorrent acts against entire international community,
and are committed for private gain, personal revenge, and generic hatred, so no lawful
justification can support their plan, purpose, or execution).
75. See Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L.
REv. 177, 194 (1945) (noting that war criminals take advantage of fact that often there
is no well-organized police or judicial system where act is committed, and therefore
hope to commit their crimes with impunity).
76. Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Jerusalem Dist. Ct. 1961),
aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 561 (6th Cir.
1985).
77. 36 I.L.R. at 5.
500 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:489
Supreme Court of Israel relied upon the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction to prosecute Adolph Eichmann for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed while executing the "Final
Solution of the Jewish Problem" during the German Nazi regime
in 1942-45. 71 Eichmann argued that the court did not have juris-
diction because the State of Israel did not exist at the time of the
offenses 9 and because Germany was the only country with the
right to punish him under the principle of territorial sover-
eignty.8° The court, however, found that the harmful effects of
the crimes on the international community as a whole warranted
the application of universal jurisdiction. 81
In 1985, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky8 2 found that, pursuant to Israel's exercise
of universal jurisdiction, the United States could extradite John
Demjanjuk to Israel for crimes committed when he was a Nazi
concentration camp guard . 3 Demjanjuk raised arguments simi-
lar to Eichmann's,84 but the court nevertheless found that cer-
tain crimes exist which subject the offender to the jurisdiction of
any nation."5 It held that the acts the Nazis committed are uni-
78. See id. at 298 (defining principle of universality as "the power to try and punish
a person for an offence ... vested in every State regardless of the fact that the offence
was committed outside its territory by a person who did not belong to it, provided he is
in its custody when brought to trial").
79. See id. at 279 (arguing that District Court ofJerusalem acted contrary to inter-
national law because only source of jurisdiction over Eichmann was pursuant to Nazi
and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 1950, and since Israel was not yet state at
time of offenses, Law is ex post facto penal legislation). The court rejected Eichmann's
argument. Id.
80. See id. (arguing that territorial sovereignty provides that because offense was
committed in Germany and Eichmann "belongs" to Germany, Germany is only country
that can try and punish him). The court rejected Eichmann's argument. Id.
81. See id. at 299-304 (stating that Israel can try Eichmann pursuant to principal of
universal jurisdiction, despite fact that State of Israel did not exist at time of commis-
sion of offenses, because "[n]ot only do all the crimes attributed to [Eichmann] bear an
international character, but their harmful and murderous effects were so embracing
and widespread as to shake the international community to its very foundations").
82. 776 F.2d at 571.
83. Id. at 584. Demjanjuk was a native of the Ukraine living in the United States
when Israel issued a request for his extradition to try him for serving as a guard at the
Treblinka concentration camp in Poland during World War II. Id. at 575.
84. See id. at 582 (arguing that because Demjanjuk is not citizen or resident of
Israel, and because crimes alleged were committed in Poland, Israel does not have juris-
diction to try and punish him). The court rejected Demjanjuk's argument. Id.
Demjanjuk also argued that Israel does not have jurisdiction because the State of Israel
did not exist at the time of his offenses; the court rejected this contention as well. Id.
85. See id. (stating that Israel is not deprived of authority to try Demjanjuk based
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versally recognized crimes and therefore are punishable by any
member of the international community.8 6
C. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention
against Torture in 1984 to strengthen existing prohibitions
against torture8 7 and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment."8 The Convention obligates states to prevent torture, 9
compensate victims of torture,9 ° and enact laws making torture a
punishable offense.91 To fulfill these obligations, the Conven-
tion makes it legitimate for a nation to interfere and prosecute
individuals when another nation is improperly treating its own
citizens.9 2
on fact that he committed acts charged in Poland because crimes alleged are universally
recognized and condemned by community of nations).
86. See id. (reasoning that crimes alleged are offenses against law of nations or
against humanity and prosecuting nation is acting for all nations). Israel, therefore,
may prosecute offenders on behalf of all nations regardless of status of Israel at time
offender committed crimes. Id.
87. Convention against Torture, supra note 15, art. 1, para. 1. The Convention
defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inten-
tionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidat-
ing or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimina-
tion of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instiga-
tion of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id.
88. See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUs, A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISH-
MENT 1 (1988) (clarifying widespread misunderstanding that objective of Convention is
to outlaw torture). Torture was outlawed prior to the existence of the Convention so
the aim of the Convention was to strengthen existing prohibitions. Id.
89. See Convention against Torture, supra note 15, art. 2, para. 1 ("Each State Party
shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts
of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.").
90. See id. art. 14, para. I ("Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the
victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation. .. ").
91. See id. art. 4, para. 1 ("Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are
offences under its criminal law.").
92. See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 38 FED. B. NEWS &J. 392, 392 (1991) (noting
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Although the Convention against Torture does not explic-
itly grant universal jurisdiction over torture, scholars note that
several of its articles create a penumbra wherein acts of torture
are universally prosecutable.9" All states that are parties to the
Convention therefore have the authority and, in fact, the obliga-
tion to take action over an alleged torturer found in its terri-
tory.94 It is unclear, however, whether such authority existed
before the enactment of the Convention against Torture. 95
D. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law that
precludes domestic courts from exercising jurisdiction over for-
eign authorities. 96 Sovereign immunity began as an absolute
privilege for sovereigns, but commentators note that the privi-
lege has diminished as the nature of relations between nations
that country's manner of treating its citizens is no longer internal matter because tor-
ture violates international human rights).
93. Convention against Torture, supra note 15, arts. 5-7; BURGERS & DANELIUS,
supra note 88, at 3. The handbook on the Convention against Torture suggests that
international law prohibited torture before the enactment of the Convention against
Torture and states the following:
Many people assume that the Convention's principal aim is to outlaw torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This as-
sumption is not correct insofar as it would imply that the prohibition of these
practices is established under international law by the Convention only and
that this prohibition will be binding as a rule of international law only for
those States which have become parties to the Convention. On the contrary,
the Convention is based upon the recognition that the above-mentioned prac-
tices are already outlawed under international law. The principal aim of the
Convention is to strengthen the existing prohibition of such practices by a
number of supportive measures.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 88, at 1 (emphasis in original).
94. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 88, at 3 (explaining that there is no safe-
haven for torturers so state parties must submit case to authorities after finding alleged
offender in its territory).
95. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that tortur-
ers are like pirates and slave traders and therefore are subject to universal jurisdiction);
Scott A. Richman, Comment, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina: Can the FSIA
Grant Immunity for Violations ofJus Cogens Norms?, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 967, 974 (1993)
(stating that customary international law recognizes universal jurisdiction over torture
and otherjus cogens violations). But see Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police
for the Metropolis and others Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581, 627 (H.L. 1999) (hold-
ing that universal jurisdiction over torture did not exist until after enactment of Con-
vention against Torture).
96. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990); William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections
on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257, 257
(1997).
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has expanded and diversified. 9v Several international agree-
ments concluded following World War II recognize individual
responsibility for criminal acts.9"
1. Development of Sovereign Immunity
One commentator suggests that sovereign immunity en-
ables nations to avoid friction in international relations.99 The
doctrine protects the sovereign's ability to uphold the dignity of
his nation, and satisfies the functional need for sovereigns to act
in their nation's best interest when travelling to another state
without fear of being subject to adjudication.'00 As a matter of
international comity,' 0 1 states generally accept the validity of offi-
cial acts of a foreign state to the extent that they comply with
international law.
10 2
97. See OLIVER, supra note 22, at 580 (recognizing that modern limited view of
immunity is more realistic because equality and independence are restricted by institu-
tions such as United Nations or other international organizations).
98. E.g., Nuremberg Charter, supra note 10; Nuremberg Principles, supra note 10.
See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald,
J., dissenting) ("The Nuremberg Principles crystallized the pre-existing international
condemnation of persecution and enslavement of civilians on the basis of race or reli-
gious belief, with the widescale atrocities committed by Hitler's Germany driving home
the concept that certain fundamental rights may never be transgressed under interna-
tional law.").
99. See Dorsey, supra note 96, at 257 (suggesting that purpose of doctrine is same
whether doctrine is based on view that members of international community are bound
by customary international law to accord immunity to foreign sovereigns, or based on
comity).
100. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 326 (stating that rationale of immunity rests
equally on upholding dignity of nation and remaining unencumbered when visiting
foreign state); OLIVER, supra note 22, at 579 (explaining additional purpose of sover-
eign immunity as ensuring that public property of foreign state remains available for
public purposes, free from forum's powers of attachment and execution); BJ. George,
Jr., Immunities and Exceptions, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: PROCEDURE 107, 107-
08 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) (providing three justifications for immunity
and arguing that functional necessity is currently most recognized theory).
101. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw § 17 (Sir Robert Jen-
nings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (defining international comity as rules of
politeness, convenience, and goodwill that states observe towards one another). Comity
involves "[n]eighbourliness, mutual respect, and the friendly waiver of technicalities."
BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 29. While not legally binding, many rules of comity eventu-
ally develop into rules of international law. OPPENHEIM, supra, at 30.
102. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 322-23 (suggesting that courts accept validity
of acts of foreign states as consequence of equality and independence of states). But see
OPPENHEIM, supra note 101, at 342 (arguing that equality, independence, and dignity of
states are not impaired when subjected to ordinary judicial process of foreign states).
The acceptance of the validity of governmental acts of a foreign sovereign is known as
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Sovereign immunity originated as an absolute exemption
from suit in another nation, regardless of the nature of the
act.103 Absolute immunity is based on the concept that all states
are equal, and that one state cannot exercise authority over an-
other. 10 4 As a result of states' increased participation in com-
mercial activity in the nineteenth century, however, the use of
absolute immunity shifted to a more limited approach known as
restrictive immunity. 10 According to restrictive immunity,
courts distinguish between acts of government, jure imperii,1 °6
and acts of a commercial nature, jure gestionis,1 °7 denying immu-
nity in the latter situation. 18 While one scholar notes that the
the "act of state" doctrine. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416
(1964) (tracing development of doctrine from its root in England in 17th century
through 18th and 19th centuries); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)
("Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the govern-
ment of another, done within its own territory.").
103. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 891 (2d ed.
1987). The U.S. Supreme Court explained the theory of absolute sovereign immunity
in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation,
by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another,
can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or
in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign
station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will
be extended to him.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
104. HENKIN, supra note 103, at 891. Several policy considerations also support
sovereign immunity, such as preventing interference with foreign relations upon ren-
dering a negative judgment, protecting foreign nations from frivolous cases or abuse of
courts, and preventing interference with governmental action. OLIVER, supra note 22,
at 580-81.
105. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 326-27 (defining restrictive immunity as de-
nial of immunity from jurisdiction for acts of commercial nature). The transformation
from absolute to restrictive immunity is also a result of the modern reality that the
concept underlying absolute immunity, that sovereigns have perfect equality and inde-
pendence, has become limited due to obligations to international institutions such as
the United Nations. See OLIVER, supra note 22, at 580 ("'Perfect equality' does not exist
outside ideal abstraction.").
106. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 327 (defining jure imperii as acts of govern-
ment).
107. See id. (defining jure gestionis as acts of commercial nature).
108. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisory of the Dep't of State, to
the U.S. Department of Justice, May 19, 1952, reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984
(1952) ("Tate Letter") (expressing Department of State's decision to shift from abso-
lute to restrictive immunity because persons engaging in business with sovereigns
should be able to have their rights determined in court); Dralle v. Republic of Czecho-
1999] UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION & SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 505
current legal position on sovereign immunity is difficult to deter-
mine,' 0 9 the trend in the practice of states leans toward the re-
strictive approach."'
2. Decline of Sovereign Immunity
Historically, individual sovereigns were not criminally re-
sponsible for their actions because sovereign immunity devel-
oped at a time when the state and its ruler were viewed as one
entity."' Head of state immunity and state immunity, however,
have developed into separate legal doctrines.' 2  The state,
rather than its ruler, is the primary subject of international law,
and is thus protected by immunity."' One commentator notes
that at one time states might have been able to use discretion in
the treatment of their own citizens, but that is not the law to-
day.11
4
Views of national sovereign immunity changed following
World War II when international agreements began imposing
criminal liability on individuals for human rights violations.' 5
In 1945 the Nuremberg Charter asserted that a head of state is
slovakia, 17 I.L.R. 155, 163 (Supreme Court of Austria 1950) (noting that doctrine of
immunity arose at time when all commercial activities of states in other countries were
connected with their political activities but that today it is different; states engage in
commercial activities and competition with their own nationals and with non-nation-
als). The Dralle court stated that "the classic doctrine of immunity has lost its meaning
and ... can no longer be recognised as a rule of international law." 17 I.L.R. at 163.
109. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 329 ("It is far from easy to state the current
legal position [on sovereign immunity] in terms of customary or general international
law.").
110. See id. at 327-28 & nn.25-26 & 31 (listing 20 countries that adopted restrictive
immunity, 11 that support it in principle, and 16 that still accept absolute immunity);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451
cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (noting that nearly all non-Communist states
now accept restrictive theory of immunity).
111. See Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The
Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 169, 170 & n.10 (1986) (explaining that today
heads of state are no longer viewed as actual state).
112. Id. at 170-71.
113. Id. at 170 n.10.
114. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 92, at 392 ("The way a country treats its own citizens
is no longer simply an internal matter, capable of hiding behind domestic jurisdiction
or national sovereignty, once the treatment violates internationally established human
rights standards."); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)
("The United Nations Charter ... makes it clear that in this modern age a state's treat-
ment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern.").
115. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 561-80 (discussing individual criminal
responsibility and development of international protection of human rights).
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not free from responsibility for crimes against humanity116 by
reason of his official position." 7 The Nuremberg Principles also
declared a lack of immunity for such crimes."11 Both the Statute
for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via" 9 ("ICTY Statute") and the Statute for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 21 ("ICTR Statute") recently reaf-
firmed this theory of criminal responsibility.' 2'
E. Jus Cogens
Several crimes violate the customary international law122 of
116. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 10, art. 6, para. (c), 59 Stat. at 1556, 82
U.N.T.S. at 288. The Charter defines crimes against humanity as:
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhu-
mane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the
war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Id.
117. See id. art. 7, 59 Stat. at 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288 ("The official position of
defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Depart-
mients, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punish-
ment.").
118. See Nuremberg Principles, supra note 10 ("The fact that a person committed
an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or
responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under interna-
tional law.").
119. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
adopted at New York, May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
120. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted at New
York, Nov. 8,1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
121. See identical provisions of ICTY Statute, supra note 119, art. 7, para. 2, 32
I.L.M. at 1175, and ICTR Statute, supra note 120, art. 6, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1604 ("The
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility
nor mitigate punishment.").
122. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 110, § 102(2) ("Customary international law re-
sults from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation."). Customary international law is divided into rules based upon states'
consent and rules that are necessary to the good of the international community. See
David F. Klein, Comment, A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of
Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 350-53 (1988) (clarifying dis-
tinction between jus cogens and jus dispositivum by suggesting that states can change jus
dispositivum and urge others states to follow because jus dispositivum is based on states'
own self-interest, while jus cogens is based on values fundamental to international com-
munity so cannot be changed on state's own volition). The first class, jus dispositivum, is
only applicable to states that continue to comply with the rules and can be modified by
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human rights.'23 Not all acts that violate customary human
rights, however, are considered jus cogens,124 or peremptory
norms1 25 fundamental to the entire international community.
126
Although commentators differ as to what constitutes jus
cogens,12 7 international law recognizes that torture has achieved
such status. 2 8  Nevertheless, commentators disagree as to
whether an individual can claim sovereign immunity for a jus
cogens violation.129
1. Definition of Jus Cogens
Jus cogens, or compelling law, refers to fundamental legal
treaty, while the second class, jus cogens, is binding on all states and can only be changed
by a subsequent rule of the same nature. Richman, supra note 95, at 974.
123. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 110, § 702 (listing acts that violate customary
international law if practiced, encouraged, or condoned as state policy, including geno-
cide, slavery or slave trade, murder or disappearance, torture, detention, systematic ra-
cial discrimination, and consistent pattern of gross violations of international human
rights).
124. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67 (1996) (defining jus cogens as peremptory
norm, or compelling law that holds highest hierarchical position among other interna-
tional norms and principles, but noting difficulty and scholarly disagreement in defin-
ing peremptory norm).
125. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (defining
peremptory norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same char-
acter").
126. RESTATEMENT, supra note 110, § 702 cmt. n.
127. See Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, Its jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 1, 6 (1990) (questioning unanswered elementary issues respecting jus cogens norms,
including its utility, how it arises, and how it abolishes or changes). But see Bassiouni,
supra note 124, at 70 (observing that it is clear that crime becomes jus cogens when there
is wide recognition among nations ofjus cogens nature of crime).
128. See Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("[Tlhe fight to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a
fight deserving of the highest status under international law, a norm ofjus cogens.");
RESTATEMENT, supra note 110, § 702 cmt. n (stating that torture isjus cogens peremptory
norm); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 88, at 12 (stating that prohibition of torture
"can be considered a peremptory norm as defined in article 53 of the Vienna Conven-
tion"). For a thorough discussion of torture as an international crime, see M. Cherif
Bassiouni & Daniel Derby, The Crime of Torture, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CRIMES 363 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
129. Compare Bantekas, supra note 23, at 766 (discussing exceptions to immunity
where jus cogens rules are violated), with Zimmerman, supra note 23, at 433 (arguing
that denying immunity for human rights violations is illegal and politically unwise).
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norms comprising the highest 13 ° rules of international law. 3'
International crimes that have acquired the status of jus cogens
contain non-derogable binding obligations, regardless of
whether such obligations are explicitly stated in a convention or
as a customary rule of international law.'3 2 While these basic as-
pects of jus cogens are widely acknowledged, 133 the determination
of how a norm becomes jus cogens is not as clear.'3 4
In 1988 in Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v.
Reagan,'35 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the crite-
ria required for a rule to become a peremptory norm of interna-
130. See BASSiOUNI, supra note 14, at 489 (explaining that hierarchical position of
jus cogens norms preempts all other principles, norms, and rules of both international
and national law).
131. See Vienna Convention, supra note 125, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S at 344 (refer-
ring to jus cogens as peremptory norm of general international law, and explaining that
treaty is void if conflicts with peremptory norm of general international law). The Re-
statement also defines jus cogens:
Some rules of international law are recognized by the international commu-
nity of states as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail
over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international
law in conflict with them. Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification
only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same character.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 110, § 102 cmt. k. For a discussion on the difficulty in defin-
ing jus cogens, and the various definitions it has been given, see Karen Parker & Lyn
Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 411, 414-16 (1989).
132. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Characteristics of International Criminal Law Conven-
tions, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: CRIMES 1, 7 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986)
(explaining that duty to prosecute or extradite international criminals isjus cogens prin-
ciple, or binding international obligation); Parker & Neylon, supra note 131, at 418
("Once an international norm becomes jus cogens, it is absolutely binding on all states,
whether they have persistenty objected or not.").
133. E.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at 489; BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 513; Bas-
siouni, supra note 124, at 67; Parker & Neylon, supra note 131, at 418; Richman, supra
note 95, at 972-74.
134. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 514-15 (recognizing that "more authority ex-
ists for the category of jus cogens than exists for its particular content"); D'Amato, supra
note 127, at 6 (questioning unanswered elementary issues respecting jus cogens norms,
including its utility, how it arises, and how it abolishes or changes). D'Amato analogizes
jus cogens to Superman, arguing that the sheer ephemerality of jus cogens seems to give
any writer the magical power to essentially create a new jus cogens norm by merely sug-
gesting that a norm has attained the requisite status. D'Amato, supra note 127, at 1-2.
But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 132, at 8 (arguing need for consistent re-affirmation of
particular duty in conventional international law for duty to constitute jus cogens); Bas-
siouni, supra note 124, at 70 (considering necessity of wide recognition before crime
becomes jus cogens). Bassiouni argues that the problems surrounding jus cogens would
be prevented by a comprehensive international codification. Bassiouni, supra note 124,
at 74.
135. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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tional law.1 36 The D.C. Circuit found that to become a peremp-
tory norm, a rule must first become a rule of customary law,
which occurs when the extensive and uniform practice of indi-
vidual nations reveals their willingness for the rule to become
law. 13 7 A customary norm evolves into a peremptory norm when
the international community as a whole recognizes that the
norm is one that permits no derogation. 38
One scholar attempted to further clarify the determination
of how a crime reaches the status of jus cogens by suggesting a
two-part doctrinal method. 139  The first element requires a
threat to the peace and security of humankind, and the second
requires a shock to the conscience of humanity.14 ° The presence
of both elements is not required for a crime to be jus cogens,"'
but if they do coexist, the crime has necessarily attained jus
cogens status. 14 2 Furthermore, three other factors must be taken
into consideration. 143 These factors include the number of legal
instruments that condemn and prohibit the crime, the number
of state legal systems that recognize such prohibitions, and the
number of prosecutions for the particular crime, both nationally
and internationally.1
4 4
Several international crimes are recognized as jus cogens.'45
Torture is included among those crimes.' 4 6 In 1992, the Ninth
136. Id. at 940.
137. Id. (quoting Meijers, How Is International Law Made?, 9 NETHERLANDS Y.B.
INT'L L. 3, 5 (1978); The North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Judgment), 1969 I.C.J. 12,
43).
138. Id. (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 125, art. 53); see BROWNLIE, supra
note 13, at 514 (defining derogation as "agreement ... to contract out of general
international law").
139. See Bassiouni, supra note 124, at 69 (suggesting crime is jus cogens if it threat-
ens peace and security of mankind and shocks conscience of humanity).
140. See id. (noting that implicit in first element, and sometimes in second, is that
questionable act "is the product of state-action or state-favoring policy"). For a tabular
analysis of elements of various crimes, see BAsSIOUNI, supra note 132, at 11-13.
141. See Bassiouni, supra note 124, at 70 (recognizing that genocide, for example,
may not threaten world peace and security, but is widely accepted as jus cogens).
142. See id. at 69 ("If both elements are present in a given crime, it can be con-
cluded that it is part ofjus cogens.").
143. Id. at 70-71.
144. See id. (explaining that large amount of one factor weighs in favor of crime
reaching jus cogens status).
145. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 110, § 702 cmt. n (recognizingjus cogens status of
genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder or disappearance, torture, detention, and sys-
tematic racial discrimination).
146. Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir.
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Circuit in Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina'47 explic-
itly reaffirmed the status of torture as jus cogens.14 8 Commenta-
tors further note that the generally accepted view among inter-
national lawyers is that the prohibition of torture is a peremp-
tory norm of international law.14
9
2. Sovereign Immunity for Jus Cogens Violations
Scholars recognize that jus cogens principles can curtail vari-
ous privileges.' 5 ° The principles can limit the privilege of state
sovereignty, for example, because a peremptory rule of interna-
tional law overrides the actions of individual states. 5 ' Commen-
tators suggest that a rule of international law based on the funda-
mental values of the international community must apply to sov-
ereign acts against individuals just as it does to such acts among
nations. 152
Greek courts recognize several justifications for denying im-
munity for jus cogens violations. 153 In 1997 in Prefecture of Voiotia
v. Federal Republic of Germany,' 54 for example, the Court of First
Instance of Leivadia, Greece, held that courts should deny im-
munity for jus cogens violations because a sovereign cannot rea-
sonably expect to receive immunity for grave violations of inter-
national law and, therefore, he or she constructively waives the
privilege by committing a jus cogens act. 55 The court further
1992); RESTATEMENT, supra note 110, § 702 cmt. n; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 88,
at 12 (stating that prohibition of torture "can be considered a peremptory norm as
defined in article 53 of the Vienna Convention").
147. 965 F.2d at 699.
148. See id. at 717 ("[T]he right to be free from official torture is fundamental and
universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international law, a norm of jus
cogens.").
149. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 88, at 12.
150. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 514 (providing example that "an aggressor
would not benefit from the rule that belligerents are not responsible for damage caused
to subjects of neutral states by military operations").
151. See Turpel & Sands, supra note 11, at 365 ("The guidance of international
legal theory toward jus cogens or peremptory law has been part of an ongoing struggle to
move beyond unrestricted state sovereignty . . . to establish an international rule of
law."). But see Mark W. Janis, The Nature ofJus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 362
(1988) (noting that state sovereignty is principle protected byjus cogens rules).
152. Klein, supra note 122, at 351.
153. Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 137/1997
(Court of First Instance of Leivadia, Greece, 1997).
154. Case No. 137/1997 (Court of First Instance of Leivadia, Greece, 1997).
155. Id. at 13.
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found that a sovereign is not acting within his or her authority
when he or she commits an act prohibited by jus cogens.'1 6 Thus,
the action does not contain the requisite character of being a
sovereign act warranting immunity. 157 Additionally, an act violat-
ing a peremptory norm is by definition null and void and cannot
be a source of legal rights and privileges, such as a claim to im-
munity. 158 National courts should also not grant immunity for
acts prohibited by jus cogens because doing so would serve to col-
laborate in the violation. 5 9 Finally, a sovereign abuses his or her
right to immunity by invoking it for protection against claims
that he or she committed a jus cogens violation. 160 Thus, the
court in Prefecture of Voiotia concluded that a sovereign loses the
right to claim sovereign immunity when he or she violates a jus
cogens norm.161
While some authority exists supporting a denial of immu-
nity for jus cogens violations, one scholar notes that the practice
of states appears to stray from this view.'6 2 In Siderman, for ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit found that torture is a jus cogens viola-
tion, but still granted immunity for acts of torture pursuant to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").163 The court
followed the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the FSIA
in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation,64
which held that immunity is only denied where Congress has
specifically stated an exception. 165 The FSIA does not explicitly
state an exception to immunity for jus cogens violations, so the
Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress did not confer jurisdic-




159. Id.; Richman, supra note 95, at 980-81 (stating that by granting immunity "the
court can be considered to be sanctioning and promoting an act that is condemned by
the international community").
160. Prefecture of Voiotia, Case No. 137/1997 at 13.
161. Id. at 12.
162. See Bassiouni, supra note 124, at 66 ("The practice of the states evidences that,
more often than not, impunity has been allowed for jus cogens crimes ....").
163. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)
[hereinafter FSIA]; Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-
19 (9th Cir. 1992).
164. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
165. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 719 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Ship-
ping Corporation, 488 U.S. 428, 436 (1989)).
166. See id. at 719 ("The fact that there has been a violation of jus cogens does not
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Scholars suggest several other reasons for upholding sover-
eign immunity even where basic human rights are violated. 6 '
One rationale is that the prohibition of acts such as torture and
the principle of sovereign immunity are both jus cogens princi-
ples, so one rule cannot override the other.168 Additionally, a
precise limitation on immunity for jus cogens offenses creates a
risk that states will deny immunity for a myriad of reasons other
than for jus cogens violations.' 69 Furthermore, even if states only
deny immunity for jus cogens violations, the ambiguous nature of
jus cogens creates a risk that states will decide that certain of-
fenses are jus cogens and strip a sovereign of his immunity, re-
gardless of whether the offense is internationally recognized as
jus cogens. 7° Finally, denying immunity could disrupt relations
between states because equality and independence of states,
which serves as the basis of sovereign immunity, is a fundamental
principle of international law. 7 '
confer jurisdiction under the FSIA."). The court found that Argentina did not have
immunity because immunity was implicitly waived under the Implied Waiver Exception
of the FSIA when Argentina availed itself of the U.S. courts to persecute Siderman. Id.
at 722. For a criticism of the Sidernan decision, see Richman, supra note 95, at 1000-07.
The Siderman decision was reaffirmed by the D.C. Circuit in Princz v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994). For a criticism of the Princz decision, see
Jack Alan Levy, Note, As Between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law of Foreign Sovereign
Immunity as Applied toJus Cogens Violators, 86 GEO. L.J. 2703 (1998).
167. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 23, at 433 (arguing that it would be ille-
gal under public international law and politically unwise to deny sovereign immunity
for international human rights violations). For a thorough critique of jus cogens, see A.
Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept ofJus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in
Bosnia-Heyzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 24-40 (1995).
168. See Zimmerman, supra note 23, at 438 ("[W]hile it seems to be beyond doubt
that the prohibition of torture nowadays forms part of international jus cogens, it cannot
be argued that this prohibition necessarily encompasses the further jus cogens rule-
thus overriding the general principle of state immunity ....") (footnote omitted).
Zimmerman argues that human rights law and sovereign immunity are two distinct sets
of rules that do not interact with one another, and therefore one set of rules cannot
encompass the other. Id.
169. See id. (arguing that countries create exceptions from immunity for human
rights violations that are not jus cogens violations).
170. See id. (opining that broadness of jus cogens will permit states to determine
that offenses are jus cogens even if not internationally recognized as such).
171. See id. (suggesting that courts of one sovereign should not be able to sit in
judgment on acts of another sovereign).
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II. REGINA v. BARTLE AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
POLICE FOR THE METROPOLIS AND OTHERS
EX PARTE PINOCHET
On October 16, 1998, Senator Pinochet was arrested pursu-
ant to two international warrants from Madrid alleging that he
ordered the murder of Spanish citizens during his dictatorship
in Chile.' 7 2 Pinochet was travelling with a diplomatic passport 173
that the Chilean foreign ministry insisted gave him immunity.
174
The British courts, therefore, needed to determine whether an
ex-dictator could be questioned or prosecuted for crimes com-
mitted outside U.K. borders. 75 The High Court first found that
Pinochet was entitled to sovereign immunity,1 76 but the House of
Lords reversed the decision. 77 Although the House of Lords'
decision was set aside due to a potential bias of one of the
Lords,17 8 a new panel of the House of Lords also reversed the
High Court decision.
1 79
A. Decision of the High Court
In a challenge to the validity of Spain's arrest warrants, the
U.K. High Court ruled that Pinochet was entitled to immunity in
the English courts. 8 ° Pinochet, therefore, would not be extra-
172. See Ex-Dictator Arrested in Britain for Alleged Murders in Chile, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Oct. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16620607 (specifying that Spanish magis-
trates charged that Spanish nationals were among more than 3000 people killed and
1198 unaccounted for during Pinochet's reign).
173. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.3 (1999) ("A diplomatic passport is issued to a Foreign Ser-
vice Officer, a person in the diplomatic service or to a person having diplomatic status
either because of the nature of his or her foreign mission or by reason of the office he
or she holds.").
174. Ex-Dictator Arrested, supra note 172.
175. Id.
176. In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. 1998).
177. Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and
others, Ex Parte Pinochet, 37 I.L.M. 1302 (H.L. 1998) [hereinafter Pinochet I].
178. See In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 430 (H.L. 1999) (holding that Lord Hoffmann
was disqualified from hearing case against Pinochet because Amnesty International,
which is organization aimed at securing observance of Universal Declaration of Human
Rights throughout world, intervened in appeal against Pinochet and Lord Hoffman was
involved with Amnesty International Charity Limited, company controlled by Amnesty
International, and did not disclose involvement prior to hearing).
179. Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and
others Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet II].
180. In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at 85.
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dited to Spain. 1 ' The court analyzed the two warrants sepa-
rately. 18 2
The court found that the first warrant,183 charging that Pi-
nochet murdered Spanish citizens in Chile, was invalid pursuant
to the U.K. Extradition Act'8 4 ("Act"). The court held that
under the Act, the alleged conduct does not constitute an extra-
dition crime'85 because extradition crimes are extra-territorial
offenses that are illegal if committed in the United Kingdom.'86
Under British law, British courts only have jurisdiction where the
defendant commits a crime outside the United Kingdom if he is
a British citizen, regardless of the nationality of the victim.'
8 7
Spain based its claim to jurisdiction on the nationality of the vic-
tims, and not on that of the offender, Senator Pinochet, a citizen
of Chile.' The court, therefore, held the warrant invalid.' 8 9
The court ruled the second warrant, alleging five offenses
arising out of official acts of a head of state, 19 ° invalid pursuant
to the State Immunity Act' 9 ' and the Diplomatic Privileges
181. Id. at 71. The court defined extradition as:
[A] process whereby one sovereign state, 'the requesting state', asks another
sovereign state, 'the requested state', to return to the requesting state some-
one present in the requested state, 'the subject of the request', in order that
the subject of the request may be brought to trial on criminal charges in the
requesting state.
Id.
182. Id. at 77-79.
183. Id. at 76. The warrant stated that "[b]etween 11 September 1973 and 31 De-
cember 1983, within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Central Magistrates' Court of the Na-
tional Court of Madrid, [Pinochet] did murder Spanish citizens in Chile within the
jurisdiction of the Government of Spain." Id.
184. Extradition Act 1989, ch. 33 (Eng.).
185. See id. § 2(1) (a) (defining extradition crime as "[c ] onduct in the territory of a
foreign state ...which, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, would constitute an
offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punish-
ment, and which, however described in the law of the foreign state, . . . is so punishable
under that law").
186. In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at 77.
187. See Extradition Act, supra note 184, § 2(3) (a) (stating that jurisdiction can be
based on nationality of offender).
188. In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at 77.
189. Id.
190. See In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at 77 (stating that offenses include
intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering and conspiracy to commit such crime,
detention of hostages and conspiracy to commit such crime, and conspiracy to commit
murder).
191. State Immunity Act, 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
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Act. 192 Consistent with these acts, the court held that Pinochet
was entitled to immunity from the English courts as a former
sovereign. 193  The attorney representing the Government of
Spain argued that immunity is limited to official functions as
head of state, and that crimes so repugnant as to constitute
crimes against humanity can never be categorized as such a func-
tion. 19 4 The court, however, declined to distinguish among offi-
cial acts, and stated that all criminal acts performed while exer-
cising public functions are protected.
19 5
The court recognized the concern that a head of state could
escape punishment for crimes against humanity.'96 It distin-
guished, however, the current situation from the Nuremberg
Charter,19 7 the ICTY Statute,198 and the ICTR Statute,' 99 all of
which state that an individual's official position will not relieve
him or her of criminal responsibility. 2°0 It found that since the
Nuremberg Charter, the ICTY Statute, and the ICTR Statute are
all international agreements, they do not violate the principle
that one sovereign state will not judge another in relation to its
sovereign acts. 201 The court concluded that Pinochet was enti-
tled to immunity from process in the British courts. 20 2
192. Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. 2, ch. 81.
193. In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at 85.
194. Id. at 83.
195. See id. ("If the former sovereign is immune from process in respect of some
crimes, where does one draw the line?").
196. Id. at 84.
197. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 10, art. 7, 59 Stat. at 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. at
288 ("The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible
officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment.").
198. See ICTY Statute, supra note 119, art. 7, para. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1175 ("The offi-
cial position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility
nor mitigate punishment.").
199. See ICTR Statute, supra note 120, art. 6, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1604 ("The offi-
cial position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility
nor mitigate punishment.").
200. In re Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at 84.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 85 ("[T]he applicant is entitled to immunity as a former sovereign
from the criminal and civil process of the English courts.").
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B. High Court's Decision Overturned by House of Lords
On appeal from the High Court, the House of Lords re-
versed the High Court's decision.20 3 The Law Lords held that
Pinochet did not have immunity as a former Head of State for
internationally recognized crimes.20 4 In its decision, the court
analyzed state immunity, the common law act of state doc-
trine, 2 °1 personal immunity, and residual immunity.
2 °6
The court found state immunity inapplicable because the
cases previously relied on under the State Immunity Act 20 7 only
applied where the action concerned civil proceedings against
the state.20  The court rejected the act of state doctrine, finding
that Parliament did not intend it to apply to legislation criminal-
izing torture and hostage taking.209 The court found that Pi-
nochet likewise did not have personal or residual immunity be-
cause such immunity extended to internationally recognized
functions of a head of state, regardless of domestic constitutions,
and to hold that torture was such a function would make a mock-
203. Pinochet I, 37 I.L.M. at 1330 (stating that certified question was "the proper
interpretation and scope of the immunity enjoyed by a former head of state from arrest
and extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom in respect of acts committed while
he was head of state").
204. Id. at 1334.
205. See id. at 1331 (reviewing several definitions given to principle but stating that
modern view is that domestic courts recognize that certain questions of foreign affairs
are non-justiciable). The court ultimately concluded that the definition accorded the
doctrine is irrelevant because Parliament did not intend it to apply in this case. Id. at
1332.
206. See id. at 1331 (defining residual immunity as broad principle of customary
international law that grants former public officials degree of personal immunity
against prosecutions in other states).
207. State Immunity Act, supra note 191, §§ 1(1), 14(1)(a), 17 I.L.M. at 1124-27.
The relevant portions of the State Immunity Act ("Act") are § 1, which provides that
"[a] State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom" subject
to several exceptions, and § 14(1)(a), which provides that references to a State include
"the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity." Id. Read together,
the words "in his public capacity" refer to the capacity in which a head of state is sued,
and not that in which he performed the alleged act. Pinochet I, 37 I.L.M. at 1331.
Furthermore, the Part of the Act that includes these sections does not apply to criminal
proceedings. State Immunity Act, supra, § 16(4).
208. See Pinochet I, 37 I.L.M. at 1331 (citing AI-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait,
107 I.L.R. 536 (1996), Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, 488
U.S. 421 (1989), Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992)).
209. See id. at 1332 (finding that doctrine cannot apply to justiciable issue in Eng-
lish courts and definition of torture in Criminal Justice Act 1988 requires investigation
into conduct of officials acting in official capacity so issue is justiciable).
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ery of international law.21° The court further noted that interna-
tional law recognized torture as an international crime long
before 1973 and as an unacceptable act by anyone, including a
head of state.211 The court concluded that torture and hostage
taking are offenses under U.K. law, and held that Pinochet was
not immune from criminal prosecution because of his status as a
former head of state.2 12
C. The House of Lords' Final Decision
In an unprecedented decision, the House of Lords granted
Pinochet's petition to set aside the first House of Lords decision
due to a potential bias of one of the judges based on thatjudge's
involvement with Amnesty International.2ls Upon rehearing the
case, a majority of the new panel of Law Lords decided that Pi-
nochet could face prosecution for the crimes he committed after
the Convention against Torture became binding upon Spain,
the United Kingdom, and Chile in 1988.21'4 The court's analysis
210. See id. at 1333 (noting that history made clear that immunity extends to inter-
nationally recognized functions of head of state regardless of domestic constitutions,
and torture is not such function, long before Pinochet rose to power in 1973).
211. See id. (referring to Nuremberg Charter and Nuremberg Principles).
212. Id. at 1334.
213. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 430 (H.L. 1999). Amnesty International ("Al") is an
unincorporated, non-profit organization aimed at securing the observance of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights throughout the world. Id. at 435. Lord Hoffmann
is not a member of Al, but is a Director of Amnesty International Charity Limited
("AICL"), a company wholly controlled by Al that carries on much of Al's work. Id. at
439. The problem arose because Al intervened in the appeal against Pinochet to the
House of Lords and became a party to the matter. Id. at 433. While Pinochet claimed
that neither he nor his legal advisors were aware of the connection until after the judg-
ment was given, Al claimed that Lord Hoffmann's involvement was a matter of public
record. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Amnesty International's Position on the Decision by the
House of Lords To Open a New Hearing on the Pinochet Case (last modified Dec. 17, 1998)
<http://www.amnesty.org/news/1998/44503598.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal). Relying on the principle that a man may not be a judge in his
own cause, the court found that Lord Hoffmann was automatically disqualified from
hearing the case, even though he may not actually be guilty of any bias. In re Pinochet,
38 I.L.M. at 439. Pursuant to this principle, once it is shown that ajudge has an interest
in the case, there does not need to be an investigation into any likelihood or suspicion
of bias. See id. at 437-39 (finding pecuniary interest not necessary in criminal litiga-
tion). Lord Hoffmann's interest alone was sufficient to disqualify him since he did not
disclose it prior to the hearing. Id. at 437. His disqualification rendered it necessary to
have a re-hearing of the appeal before a different committee because the decision had a
majority of three to two finding against Pinochet. Id. at 433, 440. Without Lord Hoff-
mann, there is not a majority for a judgment. Id.
214. Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and
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rested on the consideration of two issues. 215 The first issue con-
cerned whether the charges alleged against Pinochet were extra-
dition crimes under U.K. law.2 16 The court held that crimes
committed before the adoption of the Convention against Tor-
ture were not extradition crimes because the United Kingdom
did not have universal jurisdiction over acts of torture until after
the Convention was adopted. 217 The second issue concerned
whether Pinochet had immunity for crimes that were extradita-
ble.2t 8 The court held that Pinochet was not entitled to immu-
nity for acts of torture after the Convention against Torture be-
came binding upon Spain, the United Kingdom, and Chile. 9
1. Torture as an Extradition Crime
The court determined whether the offenses alleged were ex-
tradition crimes by examining the U.K. Extradition Act.2 20 To
fall within the definition of an extradition crime, the conduct
must constitute a crime under U.K. law and Spanish law at the
time the conduct took place. 22 1 It is not sufficient to show that
the conduct would be an offense if committed now. 2 2 2
Torture was not considered an extra-territorial crime under
U.K. law at the time Pinochet allegedly committed most of the
others Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet II]. The
only dissentingjudge was Lord Goff, who decided that neither international law nor the
Convention against Torture deprived Pinochet of immunity as a former head of state.
Id. at 609. The remaining six Lords each wrote his own opinion, but each opinion
expressed the same proposition as the other opinions in the majority. Id. at 595, 627,
641, 643, 652, 663.
215. Id. at 613-27.
216. Id. at 613.
217. See id. at 619 (explaining that torture was not extra-territorial offense until
after Convention against Torture so, consistent with U.K. law, Pinochet could only be
extradited to Spain if offense occurred in Spain and offense would be crime if occurred
in United Kingdom).
218. Id. at 623.
219. Id. at 623-27.
220. Id. at 613. The Act defines an extradition crime as "[c]onduct in the territory
of a foreign state ... which, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, would constitute an
offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punish-
ment, and which, however described in the law of the foreign state .... is so punishable
under that law." Extradition Act, supra note 184, § 2(1)(a).
221. Pinochet II, 38 I.L.M. at 582, 588. This ruling is consistent with the principle
of double criminality, which requires that the conduct constitute a crime under the law
of both the requesting and requested states. Id.
222. Id. at 613.
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crimes charged against him.223 The court reached this conclu-
sion by analyzing the Convention against Torture in conjunction
with the laws of the United Kingdom.224 Section 134 of the U.K.
Criminal Justice Act 225 effectuated the Convention against Tor-
ture, thus making it a crime under U.K. law for a public official
to commit acts of torture. 226 Furthermore, the Criminal Justice
Act made such acts an extra-territorial offense regardless of
where they were committed or the nationality of the offender.227
Although acts of torture were illegal under English common law
prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act, such acts
were not extra-territorial offenses until after the act's enactment,
and the act was not applied retroactively. 228 The court therefore
found that Pinochet could not be extradited for acts of torture
that occurred before 1988 unless they were committed in Spain
or the United Kingdom.229
The court found that Pinochet could be extradited for acts
of torture committed after 1988 when Section 134 of the Crimi-
nal Justice Act rendered torture an extra-territorial offense. 230
Almost all of the nearly 4000 alleged offenses, however, were
committed during 1973 and 1974, leaving merely 130 offenses
between 1977 and 1990, of which only three have been identi-
fied in the extradition request as having occurred after 1988.231
These three isolated charges, therefore, are the only ones that
are relevant to the question of whether Pinochet can claim im-
munity from criminal prosecution. 32
223. Id. at 589.
224. Id. at 617-18.
225. Criminal Justice Act 1988, ch. 33 (Eng.).
226. Pinochet II, 38 I.L.M. at 618.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 619.
229. See id. ("Senator Pinochet could only be extradited to Spain for such offences
under reference to section 2(1) (a) of the Act of 1989 if he was accused of conduct in
Spain which, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, would constitute an offence which
would be punishable in this country.").
230. Id.
231. Id. at 620. The three crimes identified in the extradition request as having
occurred after 1988 included one act of official torture in Chile on June 24, 1989, and
two charges of conspiracy to commit torture extending from 1972 through 1990. See id.
(noting that first conspiracy charge did not allege any acts in furtherance of conspiracy,
but second conspiracy charge alleged acts of murder following torture in various coun-
tries, including Spain).
232. Id. at 621. The court noted that Chile is the only country that can put Pi-
nochet on trial for all of the charges alleged against him. Id.
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2. Immunity for Extradition Crimes
The court considered the question of immunity granted to a
former head of state pursuant to the U.K. State Immunity Act of
1978.233 It found that immunity was not limited with respect to
acts performed in the exercise of official functions as head of
state, whether performed inside or outside the state from which
the sovereign claims immunity.234 To determine whether the
crimes alleged were considered official acts, it was necessary to
decide whether they constituted private acts committed for Pi-
nochet's own gratification, or governmental acts executed to
promote the interests of the state. 231 If the acts were official
functions of the government performed on behalf of the state,
then the head of state would be protected from prosecution,
with two exceptions. 236 The first exception applied to criminal
acts committed pursuant to head of state authority which, osten-
sibly, were committed for the sovereign's own pleasure. The sec-
ond exception related to crimes that violate jus cogens.23 7 The
court, however, found that even in the case of jus cogens viola-
tions, customary international law did not yet recognize that
heads of state lose immunity from the jurisdiction of interna-
tional courts .2 3  A provision of an international convention must
explicitly clarify a loss of immunity.239
A head of state can only waive immunity with an express
waiver, 40 and the Convention against Torture does not contain
233. Id.
234. See id. (distinguishing immunity that continues after official function ceases,
or immunity ratione materiae, from immunity only enjoyed while still serving as head of
state, or immunity ratione personae).
235. Id. at 622 (citing United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519-21 (S.D.
Fla. 1990)).
236. Id.
237. See id. (explaining that jus cogens "compels all states to refrain from such con-
duct under any circumstances and imposes an obligation erga omnes to punish such
conduct").
238. Id. at 623.
239. Id. at 622-23. The court based this conclusion on the analysis of Lord Slynn
of Hadley in Pinochet I. 37 I.L.M. at 1313-14. Slynn stated that a provision of a conven-
tion clearly asserting that immunity is not granted is necessary, and such convention
must be given the force of law in the United Kingdom through domestic legislation. Id.
240. Pinochet II, 38 I.L.M. at 623. The court based its conclusion that a waiver
must be express upon the following analysis:
Article 32.2 of the Vienna Convention, which forms part of the provisions in
the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 which are extended to heads of state by
section 20(1) of the Sovereign Immunity Act 1978, subject to "any necessary
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a provision that expressly concerns denying immunity from alle-
gations of torture. 24 1 The court nevertheless continued to con-
sider whether the Convention denies immunity to a head of state
facing charges of torture. 24 2 It recognized that Pinochet did not
expressly waive his immunity, and that the Convention against
Torture did not imply that former heads of state would be de-
prived of their immunity with regard to acts of official torture.243
The court concluded, however, that by the time the Convention
came into effect, customary international law had developed suf-
ficiently so that individuals were held responsible for interna-
tional criminal conduct.244 Furthermore, because the Conven-
tion against Torture applies to state officials, a head of state can-
not claim immunity for acts in violation of the Convention.24 5
The court therefore held that Senator Pinochet does not have
immunity for the isolated acts of torture committed after
1988.246
III. THEJUS COGENS STATUS OF TORTURE RENDERS IT A
CRIME SUBJECT TO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
BEFORE THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
ADOPTION OF THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE
The House of Lords properly held that Senator Pinochet
did not have sovereign immunity for acts of torture he allegedly
committed in Chile. The precedent of rejecting sovereign im-
munity for human rights violators, 247 coupled with the jus cogens
nature of acts of torture,2 48 indicate that there was no interna-






244. Id. at 626.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 595, 627, 641, 643, 663. Although the six Law Lords in the majority
found that Pinochet has no immunity for certain alleged offenses, they each urged the
Home Secretary to reconsider proceeding with the extradition because of the limited
number of crimes subject to prosecution. See id. at 595, 627, 641, 643, 652, 663.
247. See supra notes 111-21 (discussing individual criminal responsibility for
human rights violations).
248. See supra note 128 (specifying case law and scholarly analysis that recognize
that torture is violation ofjus cogens).
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tional sovereign immunity for such acts. The House of Lords,
however, improperly found that the Convention against Torture
was the only means of granting universal jurisdiction. Senator
Pinochet should be extradited to Spain to be prosecuted for all
acts of torture committed between 1973 and 1990, and not
merely for those acts committed after the United Kingdom's
adoption of the Convention in 1988, because Spain does have
universal jurisdiction over Pinochet.
A. Sovereign Immunity Should Not Be Granted for
Jus Cogens Violations
The House of Lords properly recognized the jus cogens sta-
tus of torture under international law, but erred in finding that
an international convention must explicitly deny sovereign im-
munity when a sovereign violates a jus cogens principle. Sover-
eigns must be held accountable when they violate fundamental
values of the international community. A jus cogens violation
strips a sovereign of his or her immunity, regardless of the exist-
ence of a convention that explicitly denies immunity. "49 While
commentators suggested various reasons for granting immunity
even where jus cogens violations occur, none justify allowing indi-
viduals to be unaccountable for acts such as torture.
1. Denial of Sovereign Immunity for Jus Cogens Violations
A jus cogens violation strips a sovereign of his or her immu-
nity because a sovereign constructively waives the privilege of im-
munity by committing such a violation. Dictators such as Pi-
nochet cannot expect to commit atrocious crimes without being
held accountable for their acts. The Nuremberg trials after
World War II made the international community aware of indi-
vidual criminal accountability. 250 The jurisdiction of post World
War 1I trials was based on the inhumane nature of the acts com-
mitted.25' Pinochet waived his immunity by committing violent
249. See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text (listing justifications for deny-
ing immunity for jus cogens violations).
250. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that Nuremberg crystallized
international condemnation of persecution of civilians).
251. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting that jurisdiction in Eich-
mann's case was based on harmful effects of crimes on international community as
whole).
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acts of torture because he was aware of individual criminal re-
sponsibility for jus cogens violations prior to his acts of torture.
Additionally, a jus cogens violation is not a sovereign act wor-
thy of protection from prosecution. Since sovereign status does
not shield a head of state when torture is committed, Pinochet
cannot be said to be acting within his sovereign authority. Be-
cause a jus cogens violation is theoretically illegal under the laws
of every nation, 25 2 it is inconsistent for any domestic court to
grant sovereign immunity to an individual facing such charges.
Granting immunity was not intended to enable a sovereign to
escape punishment. It is a significant legal right that states grant
one another so that the sovereign may responsibly pursue his or
her nation's mission without fear of adjudication. 25 3 An individ-
ual deserves the protection of immunity only in situations where
he or she must be protected from prosecution in order to serve
his or her country's needs. International law condemns the acts
Pinochet committed. Thus, he cannot expect to be granted the
rights that international law provides.
Finally, a court that grants immunity for a jus cogens viola-
tion essentially collaborates in the alleged offense. By granting
Pinochet immunity for the crimes he committed before the
United Kingdom's adoption of the Convention against Torture,
the House of Lords sent a clear message to violators from na-
tions that are not parties to the Convention, and to those that
committed human rights violations before the adoption of the
Convention, that the international community is turning a blind
eye to continued and future impunity. The United Kingdom
should have adhered to the law of jus cogens and treated Pi-
nochet's atrocious acts of torture as an implicit waiver of sover-
eign immunity. Whether Chile, the United Kingdom, or Spain
were a party to the Convention at the time of the alleged acts is
irrelevant because torture constituted a jus cogens violation
before the adoption of the Convention.
252. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (recognizing that jus cogens
principles are highest rules of international law).
253. See supra notes 99-100 (stating that purpose of sovereign immunity is to allow
sovereigns to act in nation's best interest without fear of being subject to adjudication).
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2. No Proposition Justifies Granting Immunity for
Jus Cogens Violations
While several reasons have been proposed for granting im-
munity even where jus cogens violations occur,2 5 4 they do not jus-
tify waiving individual unaccountability for crimes such as tor-
ture. First, scholars suggest that sovereign immunity and the
prohibition of torture are both jus cogens principles and there-
fore one cannot take precedence over the other. 55 This analysis
is flawed, however, because while torture is an established viola-
256tion of jus cogens, sovereign immunity is granted to foreign sov-
ereigns merely as a matter of grace and comity.257 The prohibi-
tion of torture, therefore, trumps claims of sovereign immunity.
Additionally, commentators are concerned that limiting im-
munity for jus cogens violations, coupled with the ambiguous na-
ture of jus cogens norms, creates a risk that courts will deny im-
munity for offenses that have not reached the requisite high sta-
tus of a peremptory norm.258 This risk is minimal, however,
because a rule does not become jus cogens until the international
community as a whole recognizes it as a rule that permits no
derogation.259 It would not be possible, therefore, for a state to
label a violation as jus cogens at its own discretion in order to
avoid immunity and prosecute an individual that has not vio-
lated an established peremptory norm.
Finally, scholars express concern that international relations
will be disrupted if immunity is denied to sovereigns who com-
mit jus cogens violations.2 60 They note that a basic principle of
254. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text (noting reasons for granting
sovereign immunity for jus cogens violations).
255. Supra note 168 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing case law explicitly reaf-
firming torture as violation jus cogens).
257. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (defining international comity
as rules of politeness or convenience that states observe towards one another that are
not legally binding, and recognizing that courts accept validity of acts of foreign states
as matter of comity).
258. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing risk of denying im-
munity for jus cogens violations).
259. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text (stating that rule becomes per-
emptory norm of international law after becoming rule of customary law, which occurs
when extensive and uniform practice of individual nations reveals willingness for rule to
become law; customary norm becomes peremptory norm when international commu-
nity as whole recognizes that norm permits no derogation).
260. Supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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international law is equality among states, and that one sover-
eign does not have authority over another sovereign. This argu-
ment, however, fails to recognize the fundamental violation of
international legal principles caused by the commission of
crimes such as torture. A sovereign is stripped of his immunity
when he or she commits a crime that affects the international
community as a whole. Such crimes do not deserve the protec-
tion of sovereign immunity. Claims of immunity by jus cogens
violators such as Senator Pinochet, therefore, should be denied.
B. Universal Jurisdiction over Torture Existed Before the Adoption of
the Convention against Torture
The House of Lords improperly found that Pinochet can
only be extradited for the crimes he committed after the United
Kingdom's adoption of the Convention against Torture in 1988.
Universal jurisdiction over acts of torture existed before the
adoption of the Convention. Case law following World War II
indicates that international crimes such as torture are subject to
the jurisdiction of any nation, regardless of a lack of a nexus
between the offender and the prosecuting state.2 61' Additionally,
other international conventions that encourage universal juris-
diction overwhelmingly involve jus cogens violations. 26 2 Custom-
ary international law recognizes universal jurisdiction for of-
fenses involving jus cogens violations. 263 Thus, because torture is
a jus cogens violation,2 6 4 acts of torture are subject to universal
jurisdiction, with or without the Convention against Torture.
Furthermore, and perhaps the most compelling argument
that universal jursidiction existed before the enactment of the
Convention against Torture, is that the aim of the Convention is
not to outlaw torture, but rather to strengthen the already ex-
261. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text (discussing application of uni-
versal jurisdiction over war crimes).
262. E.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. VI, 102 Stat. at 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. at 278; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973 (entered into force July 18, 1976), 1015
U.N.T.S. 245, arts. V, VI, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
263. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (recognizing universal jurisdiction
over jus cogens violations).
264. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (discussing case law and schol-
arly analyses recognizing status of torture as jus cogens violation).
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isting anti-torture controls. 265 Torture was an international
crime long before 1988 when the United Kingdom adopted the
Convention and, as an international crime, individuals were sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of any national court.26 6 Pinochet's acts
between 1973 and 1988, therefore, should be treated identically
to those committed after the Convention became binding in the
United Kingdom.
CONCLUSION
The House of Lords erred in finding that the bulk of the
crimes Pinochet committed during his seventeen-year dictator-
ship cannot be considered for extradition. Although the deci-
sion alerted the international community that individuals can
and will be held responsible for violations of international law,
the court was reluctant to do so itself. It should have subjected
Pinochet to prosecution in Spain for all alleged offenses.
It is possible that the court was pressured by political consid-
erations in reaching its decision. By denying sovereign immu-
nity and at the same time urging the U.K. Home Secretary not to
extradite Pinochet, Pinochet's critics and supporters both
achieve positive outcomes. International human rights groups
gain a precedent-setting case holding that individuals cannot cir-
cumvent punishment by claiming immunity, and Pinochet and
his supporters benefit from the Law Lords' decision urging the
Home Secretary not to extradite Pinochet. The House of Lords
might also have been under pressure to reach a similar conclu-
sion as the first panel of Law Lords so that the judicial system of
the United Kingdom would not be internationally discredited as
a result of inconsistent decisions.
Regardless of the motivation of the Law Lords, they decided
the portion of the case regarding universal jurisdiction improp-
erly. While the Lords were correct in denying immunity for the
crimes allegedly committed after the adoption of the Conven-
tion against Torture, torture was widely recognized as ajus cogens
violation and was condemned by the international community
long before the existence of the Convention, and thus should be
265. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining that international law
prohibited torture prior to the enactment of the Convention against Torture).
266. See sulra notes 56-86 and accompanying text (discussing generally universal
jurisdiction).
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prosecuted anytime and anywhere by any national court. No in-
dividual should be able to skirt punishment for committing atro-
cious acts like those committed during Senator Pinochet's re-
gime.

